Optimizely says an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in its Web Experimentation product and used it to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects. Report URI, a web security monitoring company, found the code in the scripts of 178 organizations on November 16, among them some of the most visited sites on the web.
What Optimizely has confirmed
In an incident notice posted on its status page at 01:02 UTC on November 17, Optimizely said it had identified a security incident in which an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation. “We’ve fixed the vulnerability and removed the injected code from affected projects,” the notice reads. The company added that it has taken steps to secure affected user accounts and put additional protections in place to prevent unauthorized code from being delivered.
The notice does not describe the vulnerability, give a count of affected projects or list actions for customers. The incident’s status was Monitoring when we read it.
What Report URI measured
The detail comes from Report URI’s analysis, written by Scott Helme and published on November 16. Report URI sells monitoring for the scripts that run on its customers’ pages, and the post says so.
Optimizely Web customers load a JavaScript file, called a snippet, from Optimizely’s content delivery network. The snippet holds Optimizely’s code, the customer’s experiments and an optional field called Project JavaScript, which is custom code the customer writes in the Optimizely dashboard and which runs on every page. According to Report URI, the attacker wrote code into that field in customer projects and left the rest of each snippet untouched. The file was still served from cdn.optimizely.com with Optimizely’s certificate.
Report URI fetched 1,611 distinct Optimizely snippets, found mostly through its own crawl data, and found the code in 188 of them, belonging to 178 organizations. It says the real number is likely higher, because it could only check the snippets it could find in time. Its published list includes Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC and Equifax. Banking and finance is the largest sector on the list with 32 organizations, followed by technology and SaaS with 23 and retail and fashion with 20. Report URI says the snippets for optimizely.com and login.optimizely.com carried the code as well.
A site on that list has not necessarily been breached itself. “A website can be compromised through a third-party dependency without its own code or infrastructure ever being breached,” Helme wrote.
What the code did in the browser
Report URI describes the payload as a multi-purpose kit that the attacker rebuilt 26 times during the day. Every visitor received the same script. It did four things:
- It replaced cryptocurrency wallet addresses in page text, form fields, links and the clipboard with addresses the attacker controls.
- From 13:43 UTC it watched form submissions for a card number, expiry date and CVV and sent them to the attacker’s server. Cards entered in hosted payment iframes such as Stripe’s or Adyen’s were out of its reach. Cards typed into a site’s own form fields were exposed.
- When it swapped an address near wallet or payment wording, it sent the page URL, a screenshot and any cookies not marked HttpOnly.
- On iPhones and iPads it loaded the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits in a hidden iframe. Report URI says the kit’s own comments mark iOS 18.7.3 and later, and iOS 26.3 and later, as patched.
The timeline
Report URI saw the first Optimizely injection at 04:21 UTC on November 16, in the BBC’s snippet. A mass clean-up ran from about 20:40 to 21:10 UTC, and by 21:52 UTC one of the 188 snippets still carried the code. In an update on November 17, Report URI said all infected files were clean as of 23:11 UTC and had stayed clean, and that the attacker’s main domain was put on registry hold at 00:37 UTC and no longer resolves.
As of 19:25 UTC on November 16 the attacker’s wallets had received about $7,040, according to Report URI. That figure covers on-chain payments only. Report URI says it cannot see how many cards were skimmed, how many cookies or screenshots were taken, or how many iOS devices were infected.
Report URI wrote that it does not know how the attacker gained write access to so many unrelated customer projects. It said it contacted Optimizely through several channels and had no reply when it published, and its update notes that Optimizely has since acknowledged the incident on its status page.
What content security policy did and did not stop
Report URI crawled 256 hosts belonging to the affected organizations and tested each site’s content security policy (CSP) against what the payload needed in order to load and send data out. It counted 68 organizations with no CSP at all and 50 whose policy allowed both the payload and the data theft. At 17, the payload ran but the connect-src directive blocked the outbound data, although address swapping still worked because it happens inside the page. At 24, or 15%, the policy blocked the payload.
Listing cdn.optimizely.com as an allowed script host made no difference, because the code arrived from that host. According to Report URI, the 24 protected sites had a restrictive script-src that named only the hosts they needed. Two common settings let the payload through: strict-dynamic, which extends trust to any script a trusted script inserts, and unsafe-eval, which a fallback copy of the payload used when the attacker’s domain was blocked.
What it means for the security leader
The code an experimentation tag delivers runs with the same access to the page as the site’s own JavaScript, on every page that loads the tag. In our reading, that places every user account, API token and integration able to edit those tags inside the production change path, and they belong in the same access reviews as the code repository.
We covered the same pattern in the build pipeline last week, when the wfx-loot campaign used compromised GitHub accounts to steal CI secrets, and in package installs, where we argued for a package cooldown longer than the one-day default. A cooldown has no equivalent for a script that a vendor changes on its own servers and the browser fetches on the next page load. The controls that apply are in the browser and in the vendor account.
What to do now
Report URI lists these steps for sites that use Optimizely Web:
- Open the Project JavaScript in every project and the custom code in every experiment. Look for 1688360[.]cc, for
atob(and for any script your team did not write. - Review which users, API tokens and integrations have write access to the Optimizely account, and rotate their credentials.
- If your own forms have card fields, treat cards entered on November 16 as potentially exposed.
- Treat session tokens and secrets held in cookies without the HttpOnly flag as exposed, and rotate them.
- Deploy a CSP, restrict
connect-src, avoidunsafe-evalwhere you can and turn on reporting. - Decide whether customers need to be told that the site served them the code.
For staff and customers who visited an affected site on November 16, Report URI advises updating iPhones and iPads to iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later, checking the destination address of any crypto transfer made that day and watching card statements. Its post carries the full list of affected domains and indicators, and it says it will share its archive of infected snippets, with hashes and timestamps, with affected organizations and CERTs on request.
Source: Optimizely Service Status: Web Experimentation Security Incident
Source: Report URI: World’s Largest Brands Infected With Malware Via Optimizely