ESET Research says a previously undocumented toolset it calls Cereal sat on Microsoft Exchange servers at two government organizations, one in Kazakhstan and one in Romania, copying selected email from inside the mail flow while using the victims’ own servers to receive commands.
What ESET found
ESET found the toolset on 28 November 2025 at a Kazakh government body. After tuning its detections, the company found the same toolset in Romania, where the organization was compromised on 23 December 2025. ESET attributes Cereal with high confidence to the Russia-aligned group Turla, citing another component publicly linked to Turla that ran alongside it and conceptual similarities to older Turla malware. Turla, also known as Snake, is widely assessed to be part of Russia’s Federal Security Service.
The toolset is modular .NET code. ESET named the pieces with the prefix “Cereal” because they rely on serialization, and the list includes a loader, a runner that carries encrypted command programs, a passive backdoor, an injector and an email collection module. In Romania the email module was configured to pick out messages sent to or from addresses at NATO and the EU, according to ESET.
The victim’s server is the command server
ESET researcher Matías Porolli wrote in the report: “One of the most interesting aspects of this toolset is what we did not find: external command and control (C&C) infrastructure.” Instead of calling out to an operator, the main backdoor, CerealNeuron, runs on the Exchange server and listens for web requests on paths that resemble ordinary Outlook Web Access, Autodiscover and ActiveSync traffic, including /owa/sdds/ and /autodiscover/proxyservice/. A request that is properly encrypted and passes several integrity checks is decrypted and run as a command. Anything else is redirected to a legitimate-looking Exchange error page.
ESET could not identify the IP addresses the operators connected from. It lists the consequences for defenders: there is no dedicated infrastructure to discover, block or take down, network-based tracking is limited, and malicious requests share paths with real Exchange traffic. A second variant, CerealHermit, has no network code and reads encrypted command files from disk, so some intrusions had two independent routes in.
Each command arrives as its own small compiled .NET program. ESET lists mailbox and message retrieval through Exchange Web Services, Active Directory queries, WMI queries, extraction of LSA secrets (credentials Windows stores locally), and listing, reading and deleting files. The volume of near-identical binaries led ESET to conclude that the operators run an internal framework that automates building and packaging commands.
How mail is copied without a visible agent
The email module, CerealBox, is injected into EdgeTransport.exe, the Exchange process that handles mail flow. ESET says Turla has abused Exchange transport agents before, but installed agents leave traces in Exchange’s configuration. CerealBox registers nothing. It finds the transport agents already loaded in memory and wraps their handlers, running its own logic first and then handing control back, so mail keeps flowing and no new agent appears in the configuration.
A message qualifies if it carries a .doc, .docx or .pdf attachment and matches at least one hardcoded list of sender addresses, recipient addresses, subject substrings or attachment names, while avoiding the ignore lists. Matching messages are compressed, encrypted and staged in files on disk, and operators later exfiltrate and delete the files with ordinary CerealNeuron commands. ESET calls injection into the transport service to hook mail flow a novel technique not previously documented for any malware family.
Hiding the loader in .NET
CerealLoader is the only component written to disk as a recognizable .NET file. ESET describes it using a rarely used .NET feature, Vtable Fixups, to run native code before the runtime executes its normal instructions, so a decompiler shows an entry point that does almost nothing. In one chain the loader sat in C:\Windows\System32\wbem\ under the name ncobjapi.dll, where the WMI service loaded it. In another it was placed in the .NET native image cache with names such as Microsoft.Exchange.Search.Mdb.ni.dll, so the runtime loaded it when Exchange asked for the genuine library and then fell back to the real code.
What it means for the security leader
Most network detections for backdoors look for a callback to an address the attacker controls. Cereal gives that approach nothing to match, because the only traffic is inbound requests to a server that already receives such requests from the internet. We have covered the same preference for hiding in ordinary traffic in Black Lotus Labs’ account of Volt Typhoon’s relay framework and in Layer3 Intel’s report on residential proxy exits. In our reading, the Exchange server itself becomes the place to look, since ESET’s findings show the evidence sits on the host: unexpected DLLs in the WMI folder, unexpected files in the .NET native image cache, and code injected into the transport service.
ESET’s report covers two government victims, so the confirmed scope is narrow. The targeting it describes, including the NATO and EU focus in Romania, matters most to government bodies and their contractors, though any organization running internet-facing Exchange holds the same kind of server.
What defenders should do
Compare ESET’s published indicators of compromise, hosted in its GitHub repository and the Turla white paper, against Exchange hosts. Inventory Exchange servers that face the internet and treat their file system, not only their logs, as evidence. Check the WMI folder and the .NET native image cache for files that do not match Microsoft’s own, and review inbound requests to Outlook Web Access and Autodiscover paths for patterns that do not match client behavior. Where Exchange is not needed on the internet, remove the exposure. Because ESET found staged mail files on disk, include searches for unexpected compressed and encrypted files on mail servers in the hunt.
Source: ESET Research report on Turla’s Cereal toolset, 10 November 2026