Red Hat has published advisories for two critical-rated vulnerabilities in Red Hat Quay, its container registry. Both can give an attacker read and write access to private container images that other teams pull into production.

CVE-2026-123710, found by Dave O’Connor of Red Hat, sits in Quay’s service key server. According to Red Hat’s advisory, an unauthenticated client can install its own approved signing key with no expiry, and registry tokens signed with that key are accepted for any repository, which allows reading private images and replacing repository tags. Deployments where the /keys endpoint is reachable by untrusted clients are affected. Red Hat’s mitigation is to restrict /keys at the proxy or load balancer to trusted internal components, review audit logs for service_key_rotate and service_key_delete events with a null expiration date, and remove unrecognised approved keys. It warns that deleting a rogue key is not durable until a fixed build is deployed. The second flaw, CVE-2026-110697, lets an authenticated user in a multi-tenant deployment list and steal another tenant’s robot account tokens. Red Hat lists fixed releases 3.9.28, 3.10.28, 3.12.24, 3.14.10, 3.15.9, 3.16.7, 3.17.7 and 3.18.3 and says Quay.io is already fixed.

In our reading, a registry flaw reaches every cluster that pulls from the registry, so the response runs past the registry itself. After updating, rotate robot tokens, compare the image digests running in production with what the build pipeline pushed, and alert on tag changes made outside CI. Teams that recently audited CI secrets after the wfx-loot campaign used 4,837 compromised GitHub accounts should add registry tokens to the same list, and shared clusters can use the namespace-scoped mTLS pattern AWS described for EKS to narrow which workloads reach internal endpoints.

Source: Red Hat: CVE-2026-123710