A suspected China-nexus espionage group used a zero-day in BeyondTrust Remote Support in late August and a second zero-day in VMware vCenter in early September, inside one intrusion, according to Google Threat Intelligence Group and Mandiant. Broadcom shipped the vCenter fix on November 19. For security leaders the useful part of the report is the route between the two flaws, which ran through Linux appliances that had no endpoint detection tooling.
What Google and Mandiant reported
Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) and Mandiant published two reports on the same actor, which they call ARMORY CASTLE and formerly tracked as UNC5221. GTIG attributes the activity to a suspected PRC-nexus espionage group. The first report, dated October 15, covered the group’s exploitation of BeyondTrust Remote Support. During an incident response engagement, Mandiant found evidence that the group had used CVE-2026-102764, a flaw that allows arbitrary file upload, as a zero-day in late August 2026. BeyondTrust disclosed and patched the flaw on October 15 in its BT26-05 advisory.
The second report, dated November 19, picks up the same intrusion after the group was inside the Remote Support appliance. It describes how ARMORY CASTLE reached VMware vCenter Server using CVE-2026-123890, which Broadcom disclosed the same day. GTIG and Mandiant say forensic evidence shows the vCenter zero-day was used in early September 2026. They write that the campaign involved two zero-days and three sets of malware built for the targeted devices.
Broadcom’s advisory, VMSA-2026-0009, rates CVE-2026-123890 Critical with a CVSSv3 base score of 9.8 and lists no workaround. It credits Mandiant with reporting the flaw. Broadcom describes the flaw as an authentication bypass in the VMware Directory Service and states the exposure plainly: “A malicious actor with network access to vCenter may exploit this issue to bypass authentication and gain unauthorized access to the system.”
How the intrusion moved
This section follows the order GTIG and Mandiant give and leaves out the technical detail that would help someone repeat the intrusion.
The first foothold was the BeyondTrust Remote Support appliance. From there, Mandiant observed the group move to an internal Linux appliance. GTIG and Mandiant write that “ARMORY CASTLE moved laterally to internal Linux appliances within the environment that lacked endpoint detection and response (EDR) tooling.” On that appliance the group gained root access and staged its tooling.
The group then scanned the internal network for systems with VMware-specific management services. Next came vCenter. Using CVE-2026-123890 the group created a single sign-on administrator account, and the report says the same utility could pull out the vCenter directory database and the key material used to sign authentication tokens. With that material the group could forge administrative tokens, which GTIG says allows an attacker to bypass multi-factor authentication and impersonate any user.
Once in vCenter, the group switched on the appliance’s remote shell through its management interface, collected the appliance’s master encryption key and database credentials, and switched the shell off again. It then reached ESXi hosts and read the disks of guest virtual machines from the hypervisor, which let it extract files tied to the Windows directory service. For command and control the group used a backdoor that takes instructions through a Slack channel, which Mandiant had seen the same actor deploy in a separate campaign in early 2025. GTIG also found a suspected obfuscation network of compromised third-party firewalls and routers that share one SSH banner.
Why a patched vCenter was not enough
This is not the first Directory Service bypass in vCenter this year. Broadcom’s VMSA-2026-0006, first published July 29 and updated August 19, fixed CVE-2026-59309, also an authentication bypass in the VMware Directory Service with a 9.8 score. CyberTech covered that advisory when it came out in our report on Broadcom’s emergency fixes.
GTIG says the two flaws overlap in one respect, since both let an attacker obtain a shared session key without knowing a password. It lists several differences. CVE-2026-59309 sits in the vmdir daemon’s LDAP handling, while CVE-2026-123890 sits in the vmdir RPC interface. The report states that BONESAW, the group’s exploitation utility, was run in early September against a vCenter server that had already been patched for CVE-2026-59309.
The timeline raises a harder question for defenders. Mandiant says it has evidence ARMORY CASTLE knew about CVE-2026-123890 before CVE-2026-59309 was disclosed on July 29. The recovered tool carries a build timestamp of July 13, 16 days before that disclosure, although GTIG cautions that Go build metadata can be altered before compilation. If the dates hold, an organization that applied the July fix on the day it shipped would still have been exposed to the next bug in the same component.
CyberTech has covered earlier vCenter flaws in an August article on vCenter as a five-day target and in an August analysis of how a vCenter flaw became a ransomware weapon. The Mandiant finding adds a case in which attacker use came before the advisory.
What it means for the security leader
In our reading, three decisions follow from the report, and none of them is a patch.
The first is inventory. The group’s path ran through a remote support appliance and a Linux appliance that nobody was watching. An appliance without EDR sits outside the telemetry a SOC reads every day. A list of every appliance that has a route to the virtualization management network, with a named owner and a log destination for each, gives the SOC a place to look when an appliance starts talking to a hypervisor.
The second is where vCenter sits on the network. GTIG and Mandiant spend a large part of the report on the appliance’s built-in host firewall and say it gives little protection against this kind of movement. Their reasons are specific. The firewall in the management interface cannot restrict by port for a trusted address, so allowing a backup server to reach the API means trusting that server on every port. It is administered through the same interface an attacker with access can use to turn it off. It produces no remote logs for denied connections. It filters inbound traffic only. Mandiant recommends its VCSA Hardening and Logging Tool, which enforces a default-deny posture, controls outbound traffic and forwards kernel-level events to a SIEM.
The third is the signing key. GTIG says forged tokens let an attacker bypass multi-factor authentication. Because the report describes the signing key being taken from vCenter, a suspected compromise calls for rotating the single sign-on signing material and reviewing every administrative account and session created during the window, in addition to patching.
GTIG and Mandiant put the strategic point in a single sentence of the report: “Because vCenter serves as the centralized control plane for the virtualized data center, relying solely on reactive patching is insufficient to protect it.”
What Broadcom shipped on November 19
VMSA-2026-0009 covers five CVEs across vCenter, SDDC Manager and VMware Tools. Only CVE-2026-123890 is rated Critical. The four others are rated Important or Moderate, with scores from 6.7 to 8.1.
For CVE-2026-123890, the fixed versions in Broadcom’s response matrix are:
- vCenter in VMware Cloud Foundation and vSphere Foundation 9.1.x: 9.1.1.0200
- vCenter in VMware Cloud Foundation and vSphere Foundation 9.0.x: 9.0.2.0200
- vCenter 8.0: 8.0 U3m
- vCenter 7.0: contact Broadcom Support if you have an extended support contract
- vCenter in VMware Cloud Foundation 5.x: 5.2.5
- VMware Telco Cloud Platform and Telco Cloud Infrastructure: see Broadcom knowledge base article KB463116
Broadcom lists no workaround for the vCenter flaw. The SDDC Manager flaws are an SQL injection (CVE-2026-123891), an authenticated command injection (CVE-2026-123892) and a local privilege escalation (CVE-2026-123893), and Broadcom credits Arnoldas Radisauskas of NATO NCSC for all three. Broadcom’s note says patches are cumulative and that SDDC Manager 9.1.1.0200 contains the fixes for all of them. The VMware Tools flaw, CVE-2026-123894, is a SAML token signature bypass on Windows guests that use Guest Alias mapping, credited to Noam Pomerantz.
The vCenter 7.0 row deserves attention from teams that kept that release past its general support. Broadcom’s matrix gives no fixed version for it outside an extended support contract, so those environments need a decision on contract, upgrade or isolation this week.
What the scale of the effort says
GTIG and Mandiant have tracked ARMORY CASTLE exploiting zero-days and older, already-patched flaws in edge and security appliances for initial access since 2023. They call the BONESAW utility “a significant expansion into post-compromise use of zero-days,” and they judge the resources behind the group to be large. In their words: “The use of three separate specialized sets of malware and two zero-days in the course of a single campaign indicates that there are significant resources supporting ARMORY CASTLE operations.”
The same report notes that the build date of the vCenter tool precedes its use in this intrusion by more than a month, so it was probably written for wider operations. Defenders elsewhere have reason to check their own environments. GTIG and Mandiant do not say how many other organizations were targeted, and this article does not estimate it.
What to do this week
- Apply the Broadcom fixes for CVE-2026-123890 first, then the SDDC Manager and VMware Tools updates. Decide today what happens to any vCenter 7.0 instance without extended support.
- Apply BeyondTrust’s BT26-05 update if you run Remote Support, and check the appliance against the indicators in GTIG’s October 15 report.
- List every appliance with a route to vCenter and ESXi management interfaces. Where an EDR agent cannot run, forward the appliance’s logs to your SIEM and restrict what it can reach.
- Limit inbound access to vCenter management ports to named administrative hosts, and add outbound filtering on the vCenter appliance. Use a control that does not depend on the appliance’s own management interface.
- After patching, review administrative accounts, new local accounts and single sign-on administrators on vCenter, and look for remote shell sessions that were switched on and off in short windows.
- For any vCenter reachable from a compromised appliance, plan rotation of the token-signing keys.
Source: Google Threat Intelligence Group and Mandiant, ARMORY CASTLE Exploits vSphere