NGINX released versions 1.31.9 and 1.30.7 on November 18 with fixes for a set of memory-safety flaws, the broadest of which, CVE-2026-123007, sits in HTTP/2 code that has shipped since 2015.
What was fixed
The NGINX security advisories page lists CVE-2026-123007 as a memory corruption bug in HTTP/2 flow control, rated “major” on the project’s own scale, with every release from 1.9.5 through 1.31.8 marked vulnerable. The NGINX change log dates 1.9.5 to September 22, 2015, the release that introduced the HTTP/2 module, and dates 1.31.9 to November 18, 2026. The same release fixes at least four related flaws that the advisories page and the change log describe as use-after-free bugs: CVE-2026-123633 in HTTP/2, CVE-2026-121810 in HTTP/3, CVE-2026-123634 in the DNS resolver and CVE-2026-113425 in the mail proxy module. The change log credits Xint.io for CVE-2026-123007 and CVE-2026-121810, and Albert of Vexera AI for CVE-2026-123633.
Five research groups reached the HTTP/2 flaws independently. Wiz Research says in its disclosure that Wiz Research, Ikotas Labs, Metnir, Rapid7 and Xint each uncovered CVE-2026-123633 and CVE-2026-123007 and reported them to F5, which maintains NGINX. Wiz scores both 9.2 on CVSS 4.0 and puts NGINX on more than 225 million websites.
The Wiz timeline shows how little time the second flaw had. Wiz reported CVE-2026-123633 to F5 on October 21, and F5 replied that another team had already reported it. F5 sent Wiz a patch to review on November 10. Wiz reported CVE-2026-123007 on November 16, F5 confirmed on November 17 that it matched the flaw already scheduled for release, and the coordinated disclosure came the next day, November 18.
Which setups are exposed
The five flaws do not share one entry point. The CIRCL report TR-105, written by the Computer Incident Response Center Luxembourg, tabulates what each one needs. CVE-2026-123007 needs HTTP/2 enabled on a listener. CVE-2026-123633 needs HTTP/2 plus requests proxied to an upstream server. CVE-2026-121810 needs HTTP/3, CVE-2026-113425 needs the mail proxy, and CVE-2026-123634 needs a resolver configuration with request-derived proxy names. CIRCL’s table shows that turning HTTP/2 off blocks the first two paths and leaves the other three open, so a team that disables HTTP/2 as a stopgap still has to patch.
Code execution through these flaws runs with the privileges of an NGINX worker process. CIRCL describes a further step that Xint documented, chaining an NGINX compromise with a separate Linux kernel flaw in the SCTP subsystem to reach root, including from inside a Docker container. CIRCL notes that the kernel issue had no CVE identifier as of November 18, and that a vulnerable NGINX instance “does not by itself imply host-root access.”
Rapid7, which published its own analysis, adds a practical limit. Its demonstration against an NGINX 1.31.8 container with HTTP/2 and TLS turned on needs about 128 GB of HTTP/2 data, which takes roughly two minutes on a 10 Gbit/s link and seventeen minutes on 1 Gbit/s. Because NGINX closes connections after one hour by default, Rapid7 says a network slower than about 300 Mbit/s cannot complete it. That narrows who can attack across a slow link and does nothing for a server reachable from a data center. Rapid7’s remediation table lists NGINX Plus R34 through R36 with no fix.
Why ASLR is not the answer
Teams that see “address space layout randomization” in an advisory tend to downgrade the ticket. CIRCL addresses that directly: “CVE-2026-123007 is remotely exploitable, and neither ASLR nor PIE should be considered a substitute for patching.” Xint’s technical report, as CIRCL summarizes it, documents address-disclosure techniques that bypass ASLR, so a host with full randomization is still on the patch list. CIRCL’s checking guidance says a kernel.randomize_va_space value of 2, the full setting, is not evidence that the flaws are unexploitable, and it tells teams to run the check on the actual NGINX host and kernel rather than on an unrelated workstation.
What it means for the security leader
NGINX sits at the front of many applications, so one unpatched host can expose several services whose own code is sound. Wiz makes that point, and adds that Wiz Research found both HTTP/2 flaws with an AI scanning tool. The company writes: “Complexity can no longer be relied upon as a barrier to discovery or exploitation.”
This is the third memory-safety disclosure in internet-facing software that Wiz groups together. It names PHP2Shell and Java4Shell as the earlier two, and CyberTech covered both: Check Point’s account of PHP2Shell attacks on unpatched gateways, and the Java4Shell fixes from Oracle and OpenJDK. In our reading, the pattern is a patch calendar problem. Three disclosures in a few weeks mean the web server tier can no longer wait for a quarterly maintenance window.
What defenders should do
Inventory every NGINX instance, including those bundled in ingress controllers and container images, and record which ones enable HTTP/2, HTTP/3 or the mail proxy. Upgrade open-source builds to 1.31.9 or 1.30.7, and check the vendor advisory for the NGINX Plus build that applies. Where an upgrade has to wait, rank internet-reachable hosts first and treat disabling HTTP/2 as a partial control that leaves other paths open. Do not close a ticket because ASLR is on. NGINX Plus customers on releases R34 through R36 have no fixed build in Rapid7’s remediation table, so they need direct guidance from F5 on a migration path or compensating controls. Record the fixed version next to each host, container image and ingress deployment so the next audit can confirm it.
Source: NGINX security advisories